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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310



IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (20 Feb 68) FOR OT RD-674007

23 February 1968


SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 2d
Battalion, 11th Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:


C. A. STANFIEL
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 2D BATTALION, 11TH ARTILLERY
APO 96355

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AVGE-VF

8 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Reports-Lessons Learned (RCS-GS For-65) (U)

THRU: Commanding Officer
Americal Division Artillery
APO 96374

Commanding General
Americal Division
ATTN: G3
APO 96374

Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHC-DST
APO 96375

Commander-in-Chief
United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPOF-OT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army (ACSFOR, DA)
Washington, D. C., 20310

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION AND UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (U) Administration and Personnel:

a. The 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery remains attached to Americal Division as one of the medium artillery battalions for the Americal Division.

b. Personnel Strength of the command on 31 October 1967 was:

	TOE AUTH			ASSIGNED		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
Headquarters Battery	19	1	135	19	1	124
A Battery	3	0	111	3	0	98
B Battery	3	0	111	3	0	113
C Battery	3	0	111	3	0	91
Service Battery	2	3	84	2	2	70
TOTALS	30	4	552	30	3	496

*Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10*

c. This unit currently has the following MOS shortages:

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Short</u>
13A10	236	183	53
71B20	6	1	5
82C10	7	0	7

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SUBJECT: Operational Reports-Lessons Learned (Cont'd)

d. Personnel changes during the quarter include:

GAINS	OFF	WO	EM	LOSSES	OFF	WO	EM
	7	1	53		7	1	103

e. Casualties included:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Killed in Action	1
Wounded in Action	6
Missing in Action	0
Non battle dead	0
Non battle casualties	0

f. Awards and Decorations to members of the command included:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>AWARDED</u>	<u>PENDING</u>
Silver Star	0	0
Legion of Merit	0	2
Bronze Star(Valor)	1	2
Bronze Star(Merit)	1	83
Air Medal(Merit)	4	4
Air Medal(OLC)	1	2
Soldier's Medal	3	0
Commendation Medal(Valor)	0	5
Commendation Medal(Merit)	6	29
Purple Heart	5	4
TOTALS	21	123

g. R&R Program schedules include the following:

(1) In-country R&R consists of 3 day passes to Vung Tau, RVN where facilities have been utilized by 20 personnel. Presently this battalion is receiving between 4-8 allocations per month, which is an insufficient number of quotas for the strength of this battalion. Twenty to thirty quotas would be a more realistic figure.

(2) Out-of-country R&R included the following quotas:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Hawaii	9	7	11	27
Tokyo	10	8	8	26
Taipei	5	6	9	19
Hong Kong	9	7	7	23
Bangkok	12	8	7	27
Singapore	3	2	3	8
Penang	4	3	5	12
Manila	2	2	2	6
Kuala Lumpur	2	2	3	7
Australia	0	0	2	2

h. Judicial and Non-Judicial actions by units included:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ART 15</u>	<u>SCM</u>	<u>SPCM</u>	<u>GCM</u>
Headquarters Battery	1	0	0	0
A Battery	2	0	0	0
B Battery	5	0	0	0
C Battery	3	0	0	0
Service Battery	0	0	0	0
TOTALS	11	0	0	0

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8 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Reports-Lessons Learned (Cont'd)

i. Unit mail clerks pick up from and deliver mail to APO 96355. This APO provides service for the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division at Duc Pho, RVN. During the months of August, September and early October, three to four days between deliveries were not uncommon, with several periods as long as seven days. Mail delivery has vastly improved since middle of October with nearly daily deliveries.

j. Pertinent Medical Service Statistics include:

	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Totals patients treated	149	73	180	402
Hospitalized in-country	19	9	7	35
Hospitalized out-country	13	9	3	25
Malaria Cases	1	0	0	1
Hepatitis	1	6	2	9

k. Morale remains outstanding. Beach facilities at Duc Pho are provided on a daily basis to a limited number of personnel. Movies are available on a near regular schedule. A major contribution to high morale is the battery club which serves as a day room, in addition to providing soft drinks and beer for members.

l. Educational opportunities have been provided by USAFI and Fort Sill extension courses. Several individuals are in the GED program. Enlisted men and officers have made inquiries to desired educational headquarters inquiring and receiving information and courses.

m. Religious services are provided on a weekly basis by Protestant and Catholic chaplains.

n. The Americal Division conducted an AGI of the battalion on 18-22 September. The battalion received many favorable comments and was declared to be exceptional in its ability to perform the assigned combat mission.

2. (U) Intelligence: This headquarters did not have its organic aerial observation section during the reporting period. However, limited reconnaissance was performed using aircraft provided by the Americal Division Artillery.

3. (C) Training:

a. On the job training and individual cross training continues in all units of the 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery. Personnel from survey, wire, and forward observer sections have been cross trained in fire direction techniques, as forward observers, and in liaison procedures.

b. The following periods of mandatory training were conducted during the reporting period:

(1) Code of Conduct:	2 hours
(2) SAEDA:	2 hours
(3) Escape and Evasion:	2 hours
(4) Command Information:	13 hours
(5) First Aid/Self Aid	2 hours
(6) Drivers Training:	5 hours
(7) Communications Security:	1 hour

c. A total of 44 personnel have received replacement training during the period. Training was conducted by the NCO Academy, 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

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SUBJECT: Operational Reports--Lessons Learned (Cont'd)

18 November 1967

d. Other training during the period included formal classes on the maintenance of Equipment Log Books, FADAC operations and section training.

4. (C) Operations:

a. Battery C, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (8ⁿ/17⁵) remained on CON.

b. On 31 July 1967, Battery C, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery was airlifted by CH-47 and CH-53 from LZ CHAMPS to HA THANH Special Forces Camp with the mission of reinforcing the 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery during Operation HOOD RIVER. On 3 August 1967, Battery C fired the 200,000th round in-country for the 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery which became operational on 27 December 1966. During the period Battery C was at HA THANH, all resupply was conducted by air.

c. On 10 August 1967, Battery C, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery was airlifted by CH-47 and CH-53 from HA THANH Special Forces Camp to QUANG NGIA. On 11 August Battery C road marched and set up a position in LZ CARENTAN. The battery's mission was general support Americal Division Artillery, reinforcing the 2d Battalion 9th Artillery. On 18 August 1967, Battery C moved from LZ CARENTAN to NUI DAU (BS869317).

d. On 3 September 1967, Battery A, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery was airlifted by CH-47, CH-53, and C-7A from DUC PHO to HA THANH Special Forces Camp with four howitzers. Their mission was reinforcing 2d Battalion, 320th Artillery during Operation COOK. B Battery and C Battery provided one howitzer and howitzer section, each being attached to A Battery. The remaining four howitzer sections of A Battery became attached to Headquarters Battery for Base Camp Defense at DUC PHO. The Headquarters Battery Commander was made the "Headquarters Firing Battery" commander. Headquarters Firing Battery fired 2610 rounds while it was operational. It was inactivated on 10 September 1967.

e. On 10 September 1967, Battery A, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery was airlifted from HA THANH Special Forces Camp by CH-47, CH-53, and C-7A to DUC PHO Base Camp. Since that time all batteries have remained in position at the following locations:

<u>BATTERY</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
Headquarters	DUC PHO BS 813395
A	DUC PHO BS 813395
B	MO DUC BS 730525
C	NUI DAU BS 869317
SVC	DUC PHO BS 813395
C/3/18	DUC PHO BS 813395

f. The fire missions with total amounts of ammunition expended during this reporting period are listed below:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>AMMO EXPENDED</u>
Battery A	4121	26,134
Battery B	5008	33,719
Battery C	4698	26,360
Headquarters Battery	470	2,610
TOTALS	14,297	88,823
C/3/18	4591	11,534

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5. (U) Logistics:

a. Maintenance support during the reporting period has been adequate. Difficulty is being experienced in the direct exchange of Panoramic Telescopes, M12A7C (for 155mm Towed Howitzer). The Telescope, M12A7H (105mm Towed Howitzer) can be substituted with a minor replacement of a reticule. The reticules are presently available and in the supply system. These telescopes are command controlled items and cannot be stocked at the Direct Support Unit; therefore, no direct exchange is possible. Further, no sights have been received to replace on-hand items, which has become old and worn. There are no provisions for turning in old items on receipt of new ones, because the new ones are not available.

b. Fuel injection pumps and transfer cases appear to be the main reason for the deadlining of 5-ton Cargo trucks. The replacement parts are generally not available except through cannibalization. In one instance, a 5 ton truck has been in Direct Support Unit for 87 days due to the lack of an injector pump (704th Maintenance Battalion, Job order number 31D283). Another 5 ton truck was deadlined for 53 days due to a faulty transfer case. (Job order number 31D322).

c. Generators continue to be a problem. The constant high temperature accelerates engine wear. Care must be taken to properly operate and maintain the generators which are present in a unit. Reefer coolers and ice machines are available and on hand, however, sufficient light capacity generators are not available to furnish the necessary power. Spoilage of meats and other perishables is excessive due to the lack of power for existing equipment.

d. In the development of base camp facilities, the use of tent frame kits has provided more useable space, improved the appearance of the area, and boosted the soldiers' morale by increasing protection from rain. In the firing batteries, efforts have been made to reinforce these tent kits which are affected by the blast of the howitzers.

e. The test set for the M18 computer has been non-operational for long periods due to lack of repair parts. This makes it impossible for the battalion to check the four M18 computers should trouble occur.

SECTION II
OBSERVATIONS

1. (U) Personnel and Administration:

None.

2. (U) Intelligence:

a. ITEM: Alert Notification.

(1) DISCUSSION: A sound clear alert notification system is of utmost importance to units located in a base camp, when an attack is imminent. Horns, whistles, and voice have been utilized by the unit, and they have been found highly ineffective. To provide an adequate alarm system, two sirens were obtained. However, the sirens are small and often cannot be heard above ambient noises.

(2) OBSERVATION: Each battery-size unit should procure several sirens, preferable of the size used by fire departments, prior to coming to Vietnam, for alarm notification. These sirens should be issued to units presently in Vietnam.

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SUBJECT: Operational Reports-Lessons Learned (Cont'd)

b. ITEM: Perimeter Bunkers

(1) DISCUSSION: The present system of bunkers now employed in Vietnam in permanent base camps is adequate with one exception. Their maintenance requirements include rebuilding every 3 to 4 weeks, particularly during the rainy season. This requires much time, labor, and additional materials.

(2) OBSERVATION: Reinforced concrete bunkers could be constructed at base camps once these camps are permanently established. These bunkers would be water-tight against the rainy seasons, provide more protection against mortars and recoilless rifles, and save the labor and materials that we necessarily would need for continuous re-construction.

3. (U) Training and Organization:

a. ITEM: Required Training

(1) DISCUSSION: In relative static situations, training in subjects other than the individual's MOS was accomplished. Mandatory topics as outlined in USARV Reg 350-1 were covered. With the minimum of one hour daily devoted to this training, the accomplishment of the unit's mission was not neglected. The overall knowledge received from this training increased the individual soldier performance of duties.

(2) OBSERVATION: Mandatory training at battery level with only one hour daily required improved the effectiveness, knowledge, and performance of the individual soldier.

b. ITEM: Organization of Additional Firing Batteries

(1) DISCUSSION: While deployed in the present theater of operations, this battalion on several occasions has been presented with unique challenges. Tactical operations have required that the battalion provide reinforcing artillery fire for more than one Direct Support Artillery Battalion of deployed infantry brigades, which were positioned in widely dispersed TAOR's. To meet the requirement of providing effective artillery fire, on several occasions a fourth firing battery was needed. The solution to this challenge was approached in two different manners. One solution was the formation of a provisional firing battery, "Delta Battery", with the howitzers, howitzer sections, FDC, and key officers being obtained from all batteries throughout the battalion. The two apparent difficulties encountered with this organization were the loss of a few key personnel from each battery, and the time required for the newly activated battery to adjust in performing "as a team". The second method of organization that was used was the formation of a Headquarters Battery Firing Platoon. The key personnel were obtained from Headquarters Battery and one firing battery, and the battery was subsequently deployed on an operation. The difficulties encountered with this were that the span of control of the headquarters battery commander is appreciably increased. With proper command supervision, both solutions accomplished the mission. Neither solution would be satisfactory for an extended period of time.

(2) OBSERVATION: The formation of a fourth firing unit places some strain on operations throughout the Battalion. However, highly successful operations and the accomplishment of assigned missions were achieved by using these provisional organizations.

4. (C) Operations:

a. ITEM: Fibal Technique for FADAC

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8 November 1967

(1) DISCUSSION: The recent issue of the M-18 computer has presented new challenges to meteorological sections. In the past, while an electronic meteorological message was preferred, a visual message was acceptable in those instances when the electronic equipment failed or supplies were unavailable. However, the M-18 computer requires a complete meteorological message which includes temperatures and densities. In order to construct the required meteorological message using a pibal technique the following procedures are used:

(a) Winds aloft are determined by interpolating zone height times from the DA Form 6-42. DA Form 6-46 is utilized to enter times for the computer zones. Normal Pibal procedures are followed using these new times. Table Ig, FM 6-16, provides the horizontal distance for the computer zones.

(b) Temperatures and densities are determined by using the NATO information from DA Form 6-50 (Ballistic Density from Surface Data). Departure tables for density are extended to include the computer zones and interpolation is applied to determine the departure for the computer zones which fall between NATO zones. The percentage derived is multiplied by the standard density for a given zone and the result is expressed in grams per cubic meter.

(c) The virtual temperature per cent of standard is applied to the standard temperature for each computer zone in degrees kelvin.

(d) Computer standard temperature and density are determined by constructing graphs based upon known values for NATO zones.

(2) OBSERVATION: A procedure for using the pibal technique in obtaining a meteorological message for use in the M-18 computer has been devised. This procedure enables the M-18 computer to be used having a met message from either visual or electronic means.

b. ITEM: M-18 Gun Direction Computer

(1) DISCUSSION: With receipt of the M-18 Computer, improved artillery firing has resulted. The M-18 is used as the primary means of computing firing data. This has resulted in more accurate firing with first round target hits and with less ammunition being expended for adjustments. Though fire direction personnel, for the most part, were not school trained in using the M-18, the sections through experience have made some notable observations in computer techniques of operation. The following items are the most important observations:

(a) The target altitude must be recorded as 1 meter or greater. If zero altitude height is used, upon recall, the computer will display the altitude of the battery.

(b) A double check system using the chart, GFT, and normally computed metro message is still used. This check in range, deflection azimuth and QE of a target assists in detecting any operator errors on the computer. The manual data and the computer data check within a few miles or meters. Only at maximum ranges do the two differ, with the computer providing more accurate data to the target.

(c) Muzzle velocities can be determined through registration procedures and the bracketing of the muzzle velocity with the adjusted QE when it has been determined. With the meteorological message and adjusted muzzle velocities, first round hits are obtainable.

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(d) The computer provides accurate data in all directions and at all ranges of the weapon being fired. Transfer limits are not necessary and regardless of the direction fired, first round hits are obtainable. With the manual system, firing in the opposite direction of the registration will normally require many rounds for adjustments. The computer virtually eliminates the inaccuracies which occur in this situation.

(2) OBSERVATION: The M-18 Gun Direction Computer has increased the accuracy of artillery firing while decreasing the amount of ammunition necessary for adjusting on targets.

c. ITEM: Gun Parapets (Inclosure 1)

(1) DISCUSSION: The monsoon rains cause the soil to become too unstable for firing. Often when charge 7 was fired, the howitzer had to be relayed during the mission because the ground would not hold the howitzer in position, even though trail logs were used. To solve this problem a new technique in gun parapets was used. A five foot hole, in the shape of a circle, 32 foot in diameter, was scooped out. Drainage ditches were cut and powder cannisters were positioned to provide an adequate drainage system. Sand was used to fill the hole with the center higher than the edges to provide further drainage. Then, 1 1/2" by 1 1/2" logs were dug into the edge of the pit leaving a 3 inch portion above the sand. Pierced-steel-planking was bent and placed behind the logs where the ends met. Behind the logs, telephone poles were sunk to a depth of four feet further reinforcing the logs. Three strands of cabling were placed behind the logs and PSP to tighten the entire structure. When it rained the sand packed adding more stability to the soil. In addition, by sandbagging the berm around the gun parapet, erosion was virtually eliminated. As a result, the howitzers firing charge 7 remained stationary which enable fire missions to be conducted regardless of the weather. (See inclosure for diagram).

(2) OBSERVATION: Gun parapets can be constructed so that the 155mm howitzer will remain in position and stationary when firing. This is essential during the monsoon season in this portion of Vietnam.

d. ITEM: Separate Velocity Errors.

(1) DISCUSSION: When a howitzer tube is replaced, a VE should be determined for the new tube. In the absence of calibration equipment, the M-18 computer can be used to adjust the muzzle velocity from standard resulting in a fairly accurate VE. The recording of VE's for each howitzer then enables the FDO to know exactly where the projectiles will land in relation to all six howitzers being fired.

(2) OBSERVATION: The knowledge of VE's on each howitzer is necessary for accuracy when firing.

e. ITEM: Wire Line and Power Lines.

(1) DISCUSSION: When possible, wire lines and power lines should be overheaded throughout the battery area. This is quite important especially during the monsoons. If the wire lines are left on the ground or dug in, power failures, ground out, and shorts will be experienced. Telephone poles are a problem because very few have been issued. However, by using bamboo poles, welded powder cannisters, or 8' engineer stakes as substitutes the line will be overheaded with the minimum of difficulties.

(2) OBSERVATION: Overheaded wire lines and power lines eliminate certain problems of power failure and ground out especially during the rainy season. Though poles are not issued, substitutions can be constructed.

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8 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Reports-Lessons Learned (Cont'd)

5. (U) Logistics:

a. ITEM: Panoramic Telescope, M12A7C

(1) DISCUSSION: The difficulty in maintaining operational telescopes increases with the advent of the rainy season. Lenses become fogged, moisture penetrates the seals and they become "waterlogged."

(2) OBSERVATION: Firing batteries should build some type of hot-box to attempt to keep the telescope dry. This box should be constructed so it may be placed over the telescope while mounted. A 60-watt bulb, in a small box will be sufficient in certain instances; however, not all sights may be cleared using this method.

b. ITEM: Repair Parts for Truck, Cargo, 5-ton M54 Series:

(1) DISCUSSION: Direct Support Units deploying to RVN which will be supporting elements assigned the subject trucks should be encouraged to request authorization for 180 day supply of all critical ASL items such as injector pumps, transfer cases, starters, and engines if possible.

(2) OBSERVATION: Presently, the only method of obtaining critical parts mentioned in (1) above is through cannibalization.

c. ITEM: Generators

(1) DISCUSSION: Generators of all types are a problem in RVN. Units should request permission to double their present authorization. Many units are operating with 10KW or smaller generators on a 24 hour a day basis. This accelerates the engine wear and causes much downtime, thus hampering the accomplishment of the mission. The importance of proper and timely operator maintenance cannot be stressed enough. Operator maintenance must be performed if the generator is to last any length of time.

(2) OBSERVATION: Refrigeration equipment such as 70 cubic feet walk-in boxes and ice-making machines and items such as tape recorders or movie projectors over-tax the 10-KW generators.

d. ITEM: Tent Frame Kits

(1) DISCUSSION: The tent frame kits improve the appearance of an area, but those in the firing batteries have been found to be in need of additional lumber to insure stability.

(2) OBSERVATION: In the firing batteries, many of the tent frames have to be reinforced, especially those in close proximity to the howitzers. This may be done by erecting more rafters and strengthening the roof.

e. ITEM: Test Set for M-18 Computer

(1) DISCUSSION: The battalion is issued one test set for use in maintaining four computers. Should trouble occur on a computer, the test set is invaluable in isolating the problem and determining the faulty component. Often difficulties have occurred with the test set and repair parts were unavailable to fix it. With the test set inoperative the computers had to be taken to higher headquarters for test purposes. This was very inconvenient and several days without the computer was the result.

(2) OBSERVATION: Due to a lack of repair parts, the test set for the M-18 Computer has been non-operational. This hampers operations in the battery and battalion FDC's, as there is only one test set authorized the battalion and the four computers cannot be checked should a trouble occur.

AVGE-VF
SUBJECT: Operational Reports--Lessons Learned (Cont'd)

8 November 1967

SECTION III
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. (U) Personnel and Administration:

None.

2. (U) Intelligence:

a. Recommend that a siren or similar type device be issued to all units for alert notification purposed.

b. Recommend that cement be issued to construct perimeter bunkers at a permanent base camp.

3. (U) Training:

None.

4. (C) Operations:

a. Recommend that a set of tables be developed for the nibal technique of obtaining a meteorological message for the M-18 computer.

b. Recommend that calibration assistance for weapons be made available to obtain VE's for each howitzer, especially when a new tube has been put on the howitzer.

c. Recommend that telephone poles be made available for overhead wire lines.

5. (U) Logistics:


a. Recommend that every effort be made to authorize an increased number of spare sights at firing battery level. Further recommend that units deploying to Vietnam, make every effort to obtain 100% serviceable telescopes prior to deployment.

b. Recommend that the TLL's of units deploying to Vietnam be as complete as possible. Further recommend that all direct support units be advised of the problems in obtaining critical repair parts such as injector pumps, transfer cases and starters.

c. Recommend deploying units make every effort to obtain a 15KW or 30KW generator for use in a base camp atmosphere.

d. If tent frame kits are issued, recommend those issued to firing batteries be reinforced to withstand the shock of firing.

e. Recommend a second test set for the M18 Computer be issued to each battalion sized unit to enable the battalion to have a testing and trouble shooting capability at all times.


WALTER V. APPELATE
LTC, Arty
Commanding

1 Incl
Drawing, Gun Parapet

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AVDF-AT (8 November 1967)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65) (U)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, HEADQUARTERS AMERICAL DIVISION ARTILLERY, APO
San Francisco 96374, 14 November 1967

TO: Commanding General, Americal Division, ATTN: ACoFS, G3, APO San
Francisco 96374

1. (U) Forwarded herewith are two (2) copies of subject report of
the 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery.

2. (U) This headquarters concurs with the observations and recom-
mendations contained in subject report.

3. (C) Reference Section III, paragraph 4a. This headquarters has
been attempting to procure the services of the U.S. Army Ballistic and Tech-
nical Team assigned to USARV since July 1967. The latest reply from 1st
Logistics Command is that the team will be made available to Americal Division
Artillery for calibration of howitzers as soon as possible, but no projected
date could be given.


4. (U) In each case where this report mentions a shortage, such as
repair parts or sights for weapons, it has been determined that proper
action has been taken through normal supply channels.

5. (U) Presently each artillery battalion and each direct support
maintenance battalion are authorized three spare sights. The 188th Main-
tenance Battalion has not received the authorized sights. The authorized
number of spare sights within the division should be adequate when received.

6. (U) Reference Section III, paragraph 5c and d. The generators
and lumber requested in the referenced paragraphs should be included in the
WABTOC set of each battery.

7. (U) Reference Section III, paragraph 5e. Experience based on
three months of usage of the M-18 Gun Direction Computer (FADAC) and
associated equipment indicates that a second test set is needed at batte-
lion level to insure a continuous testing capability for the four computers
authorized each battalion.

8. (U) All other copies of subject report have been forwarded in
accordance with Task Force Oregon Reg 1-19, dated 21 March 1967.


MASON J. YOUNG JR.
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

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*Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10*

AVMF-GC (8 Nov 67)

2d Ina

23 DEC 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65)(U)

MA, HQ, Americal Division, APO San Francisco 96374


TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) Forwarded herewith is the subject report of the 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery.

2. (U) Reference para 3, 1st Indorsement, a calibration team has since been made available to this command during the period 22-31 December 1967.

3. (U) This headquarters concurs with the observations and recommendations contained in the basic communication.

FOR THE COMMANDER


KAZUTO KAWABATA
Colonel, ADC
Adjutant General

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AVHGC-DST (8 Nov 67) 3d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Reports-Lessons Learned (RCS-GS For-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO 96375 26 JAN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (A2HA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning alert notification, page 5, paragraph 2a; and page 10, paragraph 2a. The recommendation that all units be issued a siren for alert notification is a broad recommendation which cannot be supported. It appears that this unit has a requirement due to present method of operation. Sirens are adopted items of equipment and listed in Supply Bulletin 700-20. The unit should include the item in next routine update of the TOE, or request item on temporary loan through supply channels.

b. Reference item concerning organization of additional firing batteries, page 6, paragraph 3b: Concur. The formation of provisional units to accomplish the artillery's mission will be a continuing requirement in RVN due to large TAOR's and widely dispersed maneuver forces. It cannot be overemphasized that proper command supervision must be exerted to insure that the units provide adequate and accurate artillery support to maneuver elements.

c. Reference item concerning pibal technique for FADAC, page 6, paragraph 4a; and page 10, paragraph 4a: Concur. The procedure devised appears to have merit and deserves further testing. Recommend the US Army Artillery Board at Fort Sill be advised of this technique and requested to perform an analysis of the procedure.

d. Reference item concerning separate velocity error, page 8, paragraph 4d; and page 10, paragraph 4b: Concur. FADAC possesses the capability to effectively establish VE for a howitzer when a tube is changed. Providing an accurate VE is essential to effective and accurate artillery fire. A

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AVHGC-DST (8 Nov 67)

SUBJECT: Operational Reports-Lessons Learned (RCS-GS For-65) (U)

calibration detachment is in-country and provides calibration services within its capability. However, artillery units will soon receive the M-36 Chronograph to establish howitzer VE's. This action should alleviate the calibration problem experienced by artillery units.

e. Reference item concerning wire lines and power lines, page 8, paragraph 4e; and page 10, paragraph 4c. Method of wire construction (overhead or buried) is the prerogative of the commander and the signal personnel responsible for providing communications support. In those instances where overhead construction is preferred, telephone poles may be requisitioned through normal supply channels.

f. Reference item concerning spare sights, page 10, paragraph 5a: Nonconcur. Fire control items are under Closed Loop intensive management. The criticality of these items precludes the indiscriminate issue at battery level. Compliance with the retrograde procedures will insure ample exchange stocks to keep units operational.

g. Reference item concerning PLL's of deploying units, page 10, paragraph 5b: Concur. POM inspections are made to determine level of PLL stockage. Action to fill the PLL's appears to be adequate. The DSU's are informed of shortages and problems in obtaining critical parts through the submission of Periodic Logistics Reports and individual queries.

h. Reference item concerning 15KW/30KW generators, page 10, paragraph 5c: Concur. This is a valid comment. However, issue of these generators is based on authorization, either MTOE or MTDA. These items in RVN are in the Closed Loop Program and issues are governed by authorizations. If units were to bring these generators with them, base camp areas could be prepared with power in a relatively short period of time.

i. Reference item concerning tent frames, page 10, paragraph 5d: Nonconcur. The requirement for reinforcement will depend on many factors which will vary by unit. Lumber for reinforcement is readily available through normal supply channels. It is recommended that the unit coordinate with the supporting engineer unit to determine actual requirements and submit requisitions for amounts required.

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AVHGC-DST (8 Nov 67)

SUBJECT: Operational Reports-Lessons Learned (RCS-GS For-65) (U)

j. Reference item concerning test set for the M18 Computer, page 10, paragraph 5e: Nonconcur. The Basis of Issue (BOI) established by Department of the Army authorizes only one test set per battalion. Additional sets are not available for issue. It is recommended that the defective set be evacuated to the support battalion for repair as soon as possible. Temporary loan for the purpose of checking accuracy of the computer may be obtained from the 723d Maintenance Battalion, 588th Maintenance Company, and the 8th Support Battalion. These units are located at Chu Lai. A message is being sent to I and II FFORCEV, all divisions, and the 1st Logistical Command, outlining the procedures for evacuation of unserviceable repairable FADAC items.

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Robert L. Ambrose
C. S. 1.3 - 17KASA
Captain, A. C.
Assistant Adjutant General

Copy furnished:

HQ, 2d Bn, 11th Arty
HQ, Americal Div

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GPOP-DT(8 Nov 67) (U) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October
1967 from HQ, 2d Bn, 11th Arty (UIC: WA2HAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)


HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 7 FEB 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG



- #1 TRAIL LOGS (DIAGRAM COMPUTED USING 11" x 11")
- #2 PERFORATED STEEL PLANKS (PSP)
- #3 STEEL ROPE (3/4" OR LARGER)
- #4 DEAD MEN

DRAWING IS NOT TO SCALE

UNCLASSIFIED

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